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INTRODUCTION

This article is about the American state attorney general from a constitutional perspective. It is therefore correlatively about the governor and the
executive branch of state government. During the past few decades, the offices of governor and attorney general in the United States have experienced
invigoration in state policy and leadership. State government reorganization
and the influx of quality governors have strengthened the governor as manager and leader of the state executive branch. Legislative mandates in broad
policy areas such as antitrust, consumer protection, and the environment and
the general growth of state government have enlarged the attorney general's
role in state law and policy.
The constitutional status and role of the state attorney general is in most
places defined in the state constitution, but "the constitutional provisions do
not expressly define all the powers and functions of the office."' The powers
and the structure of the office within state government are also the product of
statute and common law as well as historical circumstance.' The focus of
this article is the attorney general as a constitutive part of state government.
As a result, in referring to constitutional status and role, the written state
constitution need not and should not be the only reference.' At the same
1. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE
GOVERNMENT 193 (1967) [hereinafter N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION].
2. See generally Lacy H. Thornburg, Changes in the State's Law Firm: The Powers, Duties and
Operations of the Office of the Attorney General, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 343 (1990). In 44 states the
attorney general is established in the constitution, and in six states by statute (Alaska, Hawaii, Indiana,
Oregon. Vermont, and Wyoming). See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATrORNEys GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 40 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) [hereinafter NAAG].
3. Many state constitutions provide that the duties of the attorney general shall be prescribed by law.
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time, it is the constitutional status and role of the state attorney general that
is addressed here. Therefore, much of what appears in statutory provisions
and case law about the state executive branch and the attorney general, and
perhaps even some state constitutional provisions as well, will not be part of
the analysis.
The discussion is organized as follows. In the first section key features of
constitutional structure and role of the attorney general in state government
are addressed, mainly in the traditional terms of executive power, separation
of powers, checks and balances, and representation. The second section
frames issues about state government performance based on the attorney
general's constitutional status and role. Two basic questions weave through
both sections: how the attorney general is selected - election or appointment
and how the provision of legal services to state agencies should be organized - through agency employment of counsel or through a centralized
legal staff. The third section accordingly addresses different models of constitutional structure and role for the state attorney general.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND ROLE

A. Duties of the State Attorney General
The structure of the office and the duties of the attorney general vary
from state to state and are defined in state constitutions, statutes, and court
decisions in varying degrees of detail and emphasis. However, to the extent a
common thread can be discerned, the duties have been summarized as follows: providing informal legal advice and formal legal opinions to the governor and other state officials and agencies and sometimes the legislature;
representing the state, state agencies, and state officers in litigation; enforcing
state civil and criminal law; and supervising local prosecutors in some
states.4 The size and duties of the office increased during the 1970s and
1980s to embrace public advocacy roles in areas such as antitrust enforcement, child support enforcement, consumer protection, environmental protection, and utility rate intervention.5 This trend is largely the product of state
legislatures expanding the responsibilities and authority of the attorney gener-

See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. IlI, § 7.
4. NAAG, supra note 2, at 12-13; Kirk H. Porter, ST. ADMIN. 79-97 (1938); David W. Winder, The
Powers of State Attorneys General: A Quantitative Assessment, 19 SE. POL. REV. 67, 73-79 (1991); see
N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 194-95.
5. NAAG, supra note 2, at 13; Thomas R. Morris, State Attorneys General as Interpreters of State
Constitutions, 17 PUBLIUS 133, 135 (1987); see Henry S. Cohn, The Office of the Attorney General of the
State of Connecticut and Its Evolution and Duties, 59 CONN. B.J. 261, 267 (1985). For state-by-state data
as of 1989-90 on the personnel and budget of the state attorneys general offices, see NAAG, supra note 2,
app. b, at 339-47.
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al.6 State attorneys general represent the diverse interests of numerous agencies and departments, mediate conflicts among them, and attempt to achieve
coordination and consistency in litigating the positions of their states.7
As noted previously, the powers and duties of state attorneys general are
defined in state constitutions, statutes, and common law. In many states the
common law supplies authority for the attorney general to represent the state
and the public.' For example, in Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.,9 the
court upheld the Florida attorney general's power to bring an antitrust action
against major oil companies on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions without express consent of those public entities. In the absence of
legislative restriction to the contrary, the attorney general "may exercise all
such authority as the public interest requires," including initiation of the
antitrust litigation in federal court, if he determines that the public interest so
required." Courts have recognized the authority of state attorneys general to
assume primary responsibility to represent the state in litigation." Many
state constitutional provisions and statutes concerning the attorney general
simply restate common law principles." It is well-established in most states
that the legislature may restrict or withdraw common law authority vested in
the attorney general. 3
Even this brief summary underscores the breadth and complexity of state
attorney general activities. Some of those activities, such as decisions about
criminal investigation and prosecution, call for independent judgment free of
political influence from the governor. Other duties, such as advising a state
agency on implementation of a major policy initiative, may call for close

6. NAAG, supra note 2, at 40.
7. See Roger C. Cramton, On the Steadfastness and Courage of Government Lawyers, 23 JOHN
MARSHALL L. REV. 165, 165 (1990) (describing similar functions for the federal attorney general).
8. The position of attorney general in ten states expressly lacks common law authority. See NAAG,
supra note 2, at 38. See, e.g., Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1982) (West Virginia
attorney general does not possess common law powers).
9. 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. Id. at 268-74. Many cases recognize the common law powers of state attorneys general. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATToRNEYs GENERAL, COMMON LAW POWERS OF THE STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (rev. ed. 1980) [hereinafter COMMON LAW POWERS].
11. See, e.g., Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977); see also Michael B. Holmes,
Comment, The Constitutional Powers of the Governor and Attorney General: Which Officer Properly
Controls Litigation Strategy When the Constitutionality of a State Law is Challenged?, 51 LA. L. REV.
209 (1992) (arguing that attorney general properly controls litigation strategy for the state).
12. COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 10, at 4. Courts have recognized common law powers to represent and defend the state and its agencies, Martin v. Thornburg, 359 S.E.2d 472, 479 (N.C. 1987), to
control litigation and appeals involving the state, Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Knutson, 722 P.2d 1093 (Kan.
1986), to intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest, State ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 1982), to determine the state's legal policy, Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977), and State v. Jiminez. 588 P.2d 707 (Utah 1978). See NAAG,
supra note 2, at 37-38.
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 165 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1942).
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collaboration and accommodation with the governor and agency officials to
serve the public interest. This essay attempts to frame the constitutional
structure and role issues to advance the debate on how this complex set of
responsibilities and relationships should be reconciled in the state constitutional scheme.
B. Unitary versus Divided Executive Power
Most states have adopted a constitutional structure for the executive
branch that differs significantly from the federal constitution. The distinguishing feature of the federal model is the unitary executive. 4 The President is politically accountable for the executive branch. 5 No other executive
branch government official represents a constituency that could remove that
person from office.' 6 The office of United States Attorney General was created by statute and is filled through presidential appointment with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 7

14. "The executive power shall be vested in a President." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis
added); see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the
President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 994-99 (1993). However, the federal executive
branch is not strictly unitary since Congress has the power to establish independent agencies that are insulated from presidential control, see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Weiner v.
United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), and to provide for an independent counsel to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high ranking executive branch officials for violations of federal criminal laws,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). The debate over the scope of legislative control over the executive branch, especially as it affects intra-executive checks and balances, efficiency, and accountability, is
relevant though not central to the focus here on the selection of, role of, and control over principal executive branch officials. In this sense, the federal executive does serve as a unitary model, where a single
electorally accountable official-the President-appoints and directs the activities of executive branch officers in carrying out executive functions. For analysis of the issue of presidential countermand or removal
authority over executive branch agencies and individuals, see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1992).
15. The federal executive branch also is arguably not strictly unitary in the sense of political accountability because the Constitution calls for election of a Vice-President as well as a President. Indeed, recent
scholarship concludes that nothing in the text or history of the presidential and vice-presidential selection
process of Article II or the Twelfth Amendment requires members of the electoral college or the voters
who elect them to vote for a President and a Vice-President of the same party. See Akhil R. Amar & Vik
Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 918-24 (1992). However, as Professors Amar and Amar
point out, the Constitution bestows little authority on the Vice-President. id. at 939, and "the voters know
that the President, and not his Vice, is ultimately responsible for all executive policy," id. at 941.
16. Congress established the office of United States Attorney General in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92. The Attorney General is not mentioned in the United
States Constitution. But to say that the federal Attorney General's power and control of that power is in
the hands of Congress is an overstatement. See Robert E. Palmer, Note, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive Branches: An Examination of the Constitutional Balance of Powers and the Role of the
Attorney General, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331, 348 (1984). The President's appointment and removal
authority and the constitutional directive to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3. establish independent executive power for a President with respect to an Attorney General.
17. Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 29, § 35, 1 Stat. 93. Though not mentioned in the United States Constitution, the federal Attorney General has been a cabinet officer in American constitutional
government from the beginning of the republic. Article III of the Constitution contemplates an Attorney
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By contrast, the states in varying degrees typically follow a fragmented
executive branch model, with several officials serving as a result of statewide
election, each independently accountable to the voters. In many states the
constitution establishes the office of attorney general as an elected position.
This approach can be traced to the 1830s when states began to embrace
Jacksonian democracy and principal state officers began to be elected by
popular vote. The governors, who had achieved more independence from
state legislatures, were compelled to share control over administration with a
greater number of elected officials. 8
The state attorney general is popularly elected in forty-three states. Five
states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming) provide
for gubernatorial appointment of their attorneys general.'9 The legislature
selects Maine's attorney general, and the state supreme court picks the Tennessee attorney general.20
C. Separation of Powers
1. Liberty and Efficiency Objectives
Separation of powers in constitutional theory is a means to certain ends.
Those ends can be identified generally as preservation of political liberty and
achievement of government efficiency.2 Political liberty is secured through
diffusion of authority to prevent any one branch from the exercise of arbitrary power. As one of the leading separation of powers scholars noted,

General in providing for courts to carry out the functions of a judicial system that would need the participation of an attorney general or prosecutor to discharge the nation's legal representation.
18. JEWELL C. PHILLIPS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 205 (1954). Ten of 13 original states during the revolutionary period provided for an attorney general in their constitutions. Half of
those states provided for legislative appointment, and half called for gubernatorial appointment with the
consent of the council. By 1860, 11 of 33 states provided for popular election, 28 of 38 by 1880, 35 of 45
by 1900, 39 of 48 by 1920, and 42 of 49 by 1959. Byron R. Abernathy, Some Persisting Questions Concerning the Constitutional State Executive 32 (Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas Report 23 1960); see also William N. Thompson, Should We Elect or Appoint State Government Executive?
Some New Data Concerning State Attorneys General, 8 MIDWEST REV. PUB. ADM. 17 (1974).
19. In the five states where the governor appoints the attorney general, the appointment is confirmed
by the state senate (Hawaii, New Jersey, and Wyoming), both houses of the state legislature (Alaska), or
by the executive council (New Hampshire). NAAG, supra note 2, at 23.
20. NAAG, supra note 2, at 15.
21. In his seminal work on separation of powers doctrine, Professor Gwyn identified five objectives
for separating the functions of government. One is to create greater government efficiency. Three speak to
political liberty-to assure statutory law is made in the common interest, to assure that law is impartially
administered and that all administrators are under the law, and to allow the people's representatives to call
executive officials to account for abuse of power. The fifth objective, to establish a balance of governmental powers, appears to be instrumental to the achievement of political liberty and government efficiency.
WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127-28 (1965).
22. "The Framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were
critical to preserving liberty." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986). If one branch tried to use its
power in an oppressive manner, "ambition [would] counteract ambition," THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349
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the protection of liberty through separation is secured in part through the
ability of the people's representatives to call executive officials to account
for abuse of power. 3 To be able to do that effectively, accountability for
executive action should be clear. State government reorganization efforts
have stressed the need for clear accountability as a reason to limit the number of elected state officials so that the governor's power is commensurate
with responsibility.24
The government efficiency goal of separation of powers provides added
support for the state reorganization effort to focus responsibility and authority
on the governor. The framers of the United States Constitution sought to
achieve efficiency through a distribution of powers by combining a sensible
division of labor with an energetic executive who can act with dispatch.2"
The efficiency benefits of separated powers could be hampered if the internal
structure of the executive branch leads to deadlock in carrying out executive
functions. The unitary executive model can thus be understood as designed to
meet the efficiency justification for separation of powers "that stresses the
need to ensure expeditous, centralized, and coordinated authority in law
'
enforcement."26
2. Hybrid Separation of Powers Role of
the State Attorney General
The classic definition of executive power is reflected in Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, which states that the President "shall
take care that the laws be faithfully executed."'27 The state attorney general's
role in providing legal advice to the governor and state agencies and in enforcement of state laws is part of executive power. The governor is dependent on the attorney general in seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.
The attorney general, whether appointed or elected, essentially is considered

(James Madison) (Clinton L. Rossiter ed., 1961), and another branch would provide resistance, see MORTON G. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY. THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 159-66 (1987); Edward H. Levi,
Some Aspects of the Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 374-78 (1976).
23. See supra note 22.
24. LARRY J. SABATO, GOOD-BYE TO GOOD-TIME CHARLIE 63-65 (2d ed. 1983); PHILLIPS, supra note
18, at 205-11.
25. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 362-63 (2d ed. 1991); see THE FEDERALIST
No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally William C. Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of
Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 718-23 (1984); Louis Fisher, The Efficiency Side of
Separated Powers, 5 J. AM. STUD. 113, 131-33 (1971).
26. STONE ET AL., supra note 25, at 434; see N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at
93-94 (fractionated executive authority "weakens the effectiveness of the Governor").
27. "In legal theory, there is a direct line of authority running from the President through the attorney
general to the various sub-officials of the Department of Justice. Accordingly, each of these sub-officials
may be said to be assisting in the execution of the laws." Arthur S. Miller, The Attorney General as the
President's Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 45 (American
Enterprise Institute 1968).
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an executive branch official; and many state constitutions classify the position in this way. For example, the Utah Constitution provides that "[tihe
elective constitutional officers of the Executive Department shall consist of
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, and Attorney
General."' However, even though generally regarded as an executive
branch official, the attorney general is a member of the governor's cabinet in
only six states.29
Although considered mainly executive officials, state attorneys general
perform some legislative and judicial functions. Having a significant administrative official exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial chores has implications for separation of powers considerations. To the extent the attorney
general is responsible to the legislature for certain functions and to the extent
her judicial-like functions call for judicial-like insulation, the argument for
gubernatorial control weakens because the attorney general is performing
other than pure executive tasks. Gubernatorial control of such legislative and
judicial functions may undermine the constitutional balance contemplated in
a system of separation of powers. The United States Supreme Court recognized this principle when, for example, it relied on an FTC commissioner's
having independent responsibilities as the basis to uphold congressional
limitations on the President's power of removal.' In this sense the functional role of the attorney general is important in assessing the degree of independence she should have from gubernatorial influence.
The traditional separation of powers is not strictly followed in many
states where the attorney general is called upon to provide legal advice for
the legislature and the judiciary.3 To the extent the attorney general advises
the legislature and the legislators rely on that advice, and in many states they
do,32 the separation principle is blurred."3 In states where the attorney general has responsibility to review legislation either before passage or prior to
signing, this can have an impact on the governor's role in achieving a legislative agenda. 4
All state attorneys general render advisory opinions to the governor and
28.

UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 1.

29. NAAG, supra note 2, at 44.
30. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (President prohibited from removal of
FIC Commissioner before end of statutory term set by Congress). The President's unrestricted power to
remove postmasters recognized in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), was limited to "purely
executive offices." 295 U.S. at 631-32.
31. See Thorburg, supra note 2, at 356-57. Until it was rewritten in 1974. the Louisiana Constitution
placed the attorney general in the judicial branch. See Holmes, supra note 11, at 211, 214.
32. Morris, supra note 5, at 135. This role is diminishing as most legislatures now have their own
legal staffs. NAAG, supra note 2,at 55.
33. "[The attorney general] occupies a unique position. A part of neither the exccutive nor the legislative branch, he is legal advisor to both." Arlen C. Christenson, The State Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L.
REv.288, 300.
34. See Winder, supra note 4, at 75-76, 87.
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executive departments, and many issue such opinions to the legislature and
local prosecutors.3" Their opinions can shape policy and development of the
law, in part because they may be the only guidance on state constitutional
and statutory issues that are infrequently or never litigated.36 Some have
discerned, including attorneys general, that the attorney general performs a
judicial function in this role of opinion renderer, which again clouds the
separation principle.37 Certainly it is quasi-judicial if the advisory opinion
serves as an expeditious alternative to securing a declaratory judgment.3"
"[T]he attorney general tends to act where there is a need for explanation of
a particular area of the law, where judicial review is absent, and where no
legislative provision has been made for defining proper state practice."39
Although the trend has been away from early court decisions holding
attorney general opinions as binding on the recipients,' as a practical matter
the opinions work a prescriptive effect on state government administration
and therefore carry legal force comparable to a court decision.4 Some
courts hold that good faith reliance on an attorney general's opinion may be
a defense in a suit against a public official.42 In most states the attorney
general serves as counsel for judges who are sued in their official capacity
and in some represents the court system.43 Unlike state counterparts having
strong ties to the judicial and legislative branches, the federal attorney gener-

35. See William A. Saxbe, Functions of the Office of Attorney General of Ohio, 6 CLEV. MARSHALL
L. REv. 331, 333 (1957).
36. Morris, supra note 5, at 133-35 (1987); William N. Thompson etal.,
Conflicts of Interest and the
State Attorneys General, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 15, 16 (1976). A doctoral study of the Michigan Attorney
General's use of advisory opinions concluded that this process afforded the attorney general substantial
potential to influence state public policy. James E. Jordan. The State Attorney General's Use of Legal
Opinions to Influence Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of the Politics of Legal Advice in the State of
Michigan (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
37. Abernathy, supra note 18, at 41-42; Henry J. Abraham & Robert R. Benedetti, The State Attorney
General: A Friend of the Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 797-98 (1969); Morris, supra note 5, at 139.
The Florida Supreme Court declared in 1925 that "the office of attorney general is in many respects judicial in character." State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 155 So. 823 (Fla. 1925). The quasi-judicial
character of this role is rendered more problematic because the process leading to these advisory opinions
bears little resemblance to judicial procedure. No legal briefs are required, no adversary proceedings are
conducted, and there is no avenue for appeal outside the office. Morris, supra note 5, at 136; Thompson,
supra note 18, at 34-35.
38. See Dee A. Akers, The Advisory Opinion Function of the Attorney General, 38 Ky. L.J. 561, 571
(1950).
39. Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 37, at 805.
40. Morris, supra note 5, at 140-41.
41. Id. at 140-42; Jordan, supra note 36, at 12-13, 157-58; Thompson, supra note 18, at 34-35. Attorney general advisory opinions "are customarily regarded as having the force of law unless and until tested
in court." Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 37, at 798-99.
42. See, e.g., State v. Spring City, 260 P.2d 527 (Utah 1953).
43. NAAG, supra note 2, at 56.
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al more clearly functions as part of the executive branch."
3. Separation and the Administrative State
The most significant development in the structure of American government during the twentieth century at the federal, state, and local levels is the
rise of the administrative state. The framers of most state constitutions did
not likely contemplate the current size of the executive branch and the variety of agencies, independent boards, and commissions. Although a few states
reassessed the constitutional status and role of their attorneys general since
this development, most states have adhered to an attorney general role established under nineteenth century assumptions about the size and role of state
government.
Attorneys general in particular and the legal needs of state government
have adapted to the enlarged role of state bureaucracy as exigencies have
demanded. However, earlier notions of a basic tripartite constitutional division of governmental functions have been fundamentally transformed, and
the task of channeling agency discretion and making bureaucracies accountable is the primary challenge of democratic government in the administrative
state.45 As agencies, boards, and commissions have proliferated at the state
level, conflicts between agencies are inescapable and implicate the role of the
attorney general.' This challenge has been a major impetus for state government reform, a movement spanning much of this century and having as
one of its central objectives giving the governor greater responsibility, control, and accountability for the executive branch. 7
D. Checks and Balances - The Watchdog Function
Elected attorneys general contend that an important aspect of their jobs is
to serve as a watchdog over the executive branch, sniffing around the governor and the administration to prevent and prosecute unlawful conduct."'
Certainly the existence of an elected attorney general without political allegiance or administrative accountability to the governor and state agency
officials and with investigative and prosecutorial authority constitutes a check

44. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE, 1789-1990, at 48 (1992); NAAG, supra note 2, at 11.
45. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1669 (1975).
46. Robert M. McGreevey, The Illinois Attorney General's Representation of Opposing State Agencies-Conflicts of Interest, Policy and Practice,66 ILL. B.J. 308 (1978).
47. See supra note 24.
48. Abernathy, supra note 18, at 41; McGreevey, supra note 46, at 316; see also People ex rel.
Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Cal. 1981) (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("The Attorney
General's traditional watchdog function and his power to challenge questionable official conduct are important and necessary tools to assure the continued integrity of our system of government.").
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and balance feature of the executive branch of state government, a means for
"ambition ... to counteract ambition."49 The problem: who guards the
guardians?
[A]t some point this series of watchdogs-watching-watchdogswatch administrators has to terminate in the people being their
own watchdog. They may as well watch the governor directly....
[T]heir "watching" is much simpler when they have only the
governor, responsible for the entire operation of the state's business, to watch, than when their attention must be divided."
Implicit in the attorney general watchdog position is the assumption that
the elected attorney general is less subject to temptation for wrongdoing than
the governor and key gubernatorial appointees. The opposite is as likely to
be expected because there is much greater public scrutiny of the governor
than the attorney general.5 Also implicit in the watchdog notion is that this
check promotes executive branch accountability. Again, as more fully discussed below, an independently elected attorney general may actually diminish the electoral accountability of the executive branch by obscuring responsibility.
The deviation of the independently elected state attorney general from
the traditional separation of powers model is manifested in the added check
and balance in the executive branch that such an arrangement produces. The
general issue it raises is the conflict between the attempt to separate and
divide powers to restrain government, and the effort to organize government
to act effectively for the public good.52
The attorney general, of course, is not the only source of check and
balance on the governor. Indeed, in the American constitutional system of
separation of powers, the legislature and the judiciary are supposed to perform that function. As state legislatures continue to become more full-time
and less part-time and take their executive oversight responsibility more
seriously, the need for internal checks by fragmenting the executive branch
diminishes. The idea of checks and balances is that they operate between, as
opposed to within, the three divisions or departments of government. Of
course, to the extent an independent attorney general through exercise of the
check and balance watchdog function affects the relationship of the executive
with the other branches of state government, separation of powers is affected
as well.

49. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton L. Rossiter ed., 1961).
50. Abernathy, supra note 18, at 46.
51. Id.
52. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (2d ed. 1988).
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E. Representative of the People or of the State
A distinction is sometimes drawn as to whether the attorney general, as a
lawyer, represents the people or state government; and it is drawn more
sharply when the attorney general achieves office as a state-wide elected
representative of the people.53 This issue is conceptually more subtle than
the simple distinction suggests, and guidance initially should be sought
through notions of sovereignty and representation.
1. Representation and Delegated Sovereign Power
The office of attorney general is rooted in seven hundred years of AngloAmerican history. Since the mid-thirteenth century, specially appointed lawyers have represented the sovereign's legal interests.' In England the role
of the attorney general to the present day is based upon representation of the
sovereign, which is the principle supporting the attorney general as representative of the public interest.55 American constitutional developments during
the revolutionary period shifted sovereignty to the people, who select their
representatives to exercise delegated sovereign authority.56
Accordingly, when an attorney general provides legal services to a state
officer or agency, she does so to facilitate the officer or agency in exercising
delegated sovereign power. When an attorney general enforces consumer, environmental, or health legislation, she does so to implement public policy
adopted pursuant to the delegated sovereign authority of the legislature. In
both instances, the attorney general is representing the public interest. As one
attorney general put it, "[lIt is imperative that the Attorney General simultaneously represent both the state agency and the public interest."57
2. Representation and Multiple Roles
The attorney general's office must play several roles and serve multiple
interests. As Professor and former Assistant United States Attorney General
for the Civil Division Barbara Babcock describes it, the government lawyer
represents the client agency, she further represents the state as a litigant in
court, and she must take account of the public.58 Perhaps a more workable
dichotomy than representation of the state or the public is to view the attorney general's role as combining loyalty to the executive with loyalty to the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
SHALL

See Holmes, supra note 11, at 214 n.25.
NAAG, supra note 2, at 3-6; Thornburg, supra note 2, at 346.
NAAG, supra note 2, at 30.
GORDON S.WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 372-83 (1969).
Thornburg, supra note 2,at 359: see Saxbe. supra note 35, at 334.
Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 23 JOHN MARL. REV. 181, 185 (1990).
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law. The attorney general, appointed or elected, fulfills responsibilities to the
executive and the public by maintaining the obligation to respect and follow
the law. 9
In areas such as antitrust or consumer protection, the attorney general
typically is authorized to assume the role of advocate for the state and represent the public interest consistent with the scope of discretion the legislative
mandate allows. The attorney general appears in such litigation as a result of
enforcement discretion and acts as the legal representative of the state and
the public interest. The role can be different when the attorney general is
advising or representing a state official or agency. In litigation on behalf of a
state agency or official, the attorney general does not appear as a party to the
action.' In this context of agency representation, the representative role tension can become most acute.
The problem arises, of course, when the attorney general has a different
conception of the public interest than the governor or the state agency and
claims that her primary responsibility is to the people (her view of the public
interest) and not to an agency (the governor's or the agency's view of the
public interest).6 The problem is resolved if the attorney general confines
her role to that of a lawyer providing legal services to a client agency. The
client's view of the public interest, if not in violation of state law, would
prevail.62 This resolution is more easily achieved when accountability for
executive branch performance is clear. At the federal level, the presumption
is that the President is acting in the public interest, and government lawyers
are expected to support that position subject to adherence to law and professional bounds of honesty and advocacy.63
Even when the attorney general is elected, resolution is possible if the
authority of the office is understood to extend only to serving in a lawyer's
role to those delegated sovereign powers of the executive branch.' Howev-

59. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 62-66 (1987).
60. See Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 918-19 (W. Va. 1982).
61. See McGreevey, supra note 46, at 316-17. The pressure on the attorney general-state agency relationship "is especially so when the Attorney General and the agency-client are headed by policy makers of
different partisan persuasions." Thornburg, supra note 2, at 358.
62. "The Attorney General's role and duty is to exercise his skill as the state's chief lawyer to zealously advocate and defend the policy position of the officer or agency in litigation." Manchin, 296 S.E.2d
at 920.
63. See Thomas E. Kauper, Politics and the Justice Department: A View from the Trenches, 9 J.L. &
POL. 257, 265 (1993).
64. When Pennsylvania voters decided in 1978 to convert from an appointed to an elected attorney
general, the commission charged with making recommendations to implement this change declared: "The
elected Attorney General is not to function as a policymaker. Instead, the Attorney General's role is intended to encompass only the traditional role of lawyers in society .... JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT
COMMISSION, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, OFFICE OF ELECTED
ATTORNEY GENERAL-FINAL REPORT 5 (1978).

As one commentator put it with respect to federal government attorneys, "Ultimately, however, the

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6

er, in light of the common law authority recognized in some jurisdictions as
granting attorneys general discretion to ignore agency clients in the institution of litigation on behalf of those clients,' an attorney general who is answerable to a governor who is in turn responsible for serving the public
interest on behalf of the executive branch constitutes the more accountable
constitutional structure.
3. Representation and Defining the Public Interest
Attorneys general who tout their public interest responsibilities in representation seldom answer the obvious problem: "It is commonplace that there
are as many ideas of the 'public interest' as there are people who think about
the subject."' Professor Babcock supplies the response for the federal government lawyer, who "should take her definition of the public interest from
the presidential administration in which she serves."'67 As another commentator put it, it is "hard ...to define the public interest except in terms of the
current administration's policies."6" This point has grown in significance
with the federal attorney general's increasingly prominent role in shaping
national policy.'
For a state attorney general with independent electoral accountability, the
issue is more cloudy. It is unrealistic to think an independently elected attorney general will confine herself in this manner. A recent Attorney General of
Virginia wrote that "there has been a trend in recent years to expand the
Attorney General's role in the development of public policy" and that
"[tihere are good practical reasons for linking the public sector practice of
law and the development of public policy."7 There may be great benefit in
drawing upon the experience and the resources of the attorney general's
office to facilitate policy development and law reform, and administrators
play a significant part in making decisions and shaping procedures to address
competing values in public decisions.7 But none of this is inconsistent with

career lawyer's obligation is to the responsible officials who have been properly selected through our
constitutional processes of election or appointment to define the interests of the United States." Cramton,
supra note 7,at 167 (citation omitted).
65. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
66. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1293-95 (1987).
67. Babcock, supra note 58, at 191.
68. Id. at 192.
69. Thomas M. Boyd, Separating Law Enforcement from Policy: The Importance of Perception,9 J.L.
& POL. 299, 303 (1993).
70. Mary Sue Terry, The Public Sector Practice of Law and the Development of Public Policy, 6 J.L.
& POL. 743, 743 (1990).
71. See Douglas T. Yates, Jr., Hard Choices: Justifying Bureaucratic Decisions, in PUBLIC DUTIES:
THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (Joel L. Fleishman let al. eds., 1981).
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or greater than the value of coherent and accountable executive branch policy.
When attorneys general urge that they should seek "to shape the public
policy through suasion and the force of leadership,"72 variance and conflict
with the governor's policy agenda is inevitable. And if "the practice of law
in the public sector must go hand in hand with the development of public
policy,"73 then this conflict produces the accountability problem and conflict
of loyalty described below. There is no reason to assume that the attorney
general can ascertain the public interest better than the governor, who is
elected in the same statewide election but indisputably attracts more interest
and attention than the attorney general.74 The California Supreme Court
made one of the few authoritative attempts to resolve this conflict when it
interpreted the state constitution to require that when the governor and attorney general differ "over the faithful execution of the laws of this state, the
Governor retains the 'supreme executive power' to determine the public
interest."75
The resolution is more difficult if the attorney general concludes that her
conception of the public interest conforms to legal requisites that conflict
with the governor's or state agency's view of the public interest. Some attorneys general have sued to stop actions of agencies that otherwise would
have been their clients, a matter that will be discussed further below.
II. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

A. Accountability
State administrative agencies perform most of what state governments do,
and the fairness, efficiency, and overall quality of that performance depend
upon accountability.76 Indeed, a central challenge of democratic government
is to ensure that government officials are accountable.77
1. Gubernatorial Authority and Responsibility
In state government the people think the buck stops with the governor,
irrespective of whether other elected officials should bear the responsibility.
Leading gubernatorial scholar Larry Sabato explains: "The public is not

72. Terry, supra note 70, at 753.
73.
74.

Id. at 754.
Abernathy, supra note 18, at 46.

75. People ex rel, Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1981).
76. Richard C. Elling, State Bureaucracies, in PoLITICs IN THE AMERICAN STATES 244-48 (Virginia
Gray et al. eds., 4th ed. 1983).

77. "[W]e are still grappling with the same question that confronted the delegates over 200 years ago:
How to establish a well-administered federal government that is also responsible to the people." Prakash,
supra note 14, at 1016. The same point applies to state government.
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particularly discriminating when it comes time to assign the blame for inaction. Other elected officials may well have caused the foot-dragging, but as
the 'head' of state government the governor must bear the consequences.""8
A multi-headed executive branch contains a built-in tension between the
attorney general's role as counsel for the state and the attorney general's
independent electoral accountability. The conventional arrangement is that
the governor appoints cabinet or department officials to administer state
agencies. The attorney general serves as the lawyer for the governor and the
agencies, and therefore owes a duty of loyalty to these clients. However,
when the attorney general is elected independently of the governor, the governor cannot remove the attorney general from office on grounds of disloyalty or poor performance. And if the attorney general's actions cause poor
performance from an executive branch agency or interference with implementation of the governor's policy objectives, the governor may nonetheless
be held politically accountable as the leading political figure in the executive
branch. "The fact is that people look to the governor to get the job done."' 9
That would be more appropriate if the governor or her appointed agency
officials were responsible for the hiring and Supervision of legal advisors, but
that is not the system in most states.
The result is that "[e]very official accused of incompetence places the
blame at another's door .... Officers will not cooperate, and there is no way
of compelling them to do so."' The critical question is: who is in charge,
or where is accountability placed?"' That question must be answered if the
constitutional theory underlying separation of powers is to be realized.82 The
principle at stake is that the person who is ultimately held responsible for the
operation of the executive branch should be able to count on the cooperation
of advisors, including legal advisors.8 3 Or, to put it in terms of well-estab-

supra note 24, at 65.
Id. (quoting former Governor Reubin Askew of Florida).

78.
79.

SABATO,

80.

AUSTIN

F.

MACDONALD, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

157-58 (1960).

"In Michigan, it has become impossible as a practical matter to unequivocally charge the Governor with
full responsibility for his administration. If projects fail, it is simple to 'pass the buck,' whereas, a focusing of accountability on a single chief executive results in greater accomplishment." Marie H. Kamberg,
Should the Governor Appoint the Secretary of State and Attorney General? Yes!, 27 MICH. ST. B.J. 32
(1948).
81. Beyle, infra note 97, at 192.
82. See text at notes 44-47, supra.
83. As one commentator puts it:
If the governor is to be held responsible for the handling of all the state's business...
it follows almost inescapably that he must have control over the staff service of providing
legal aid and advice to his other subordinates, as well as control over the line function of
prosecuting offenders against the state laws and representing the state in all other litigation ....
The popular election of the attorney general with his responsibility being directly
to the people produces a division and a diffusion of the basic responsibility of the governor
to see that the laws are fairly executed, and flies in the face of accepted principles of good
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lished government organization theory, authority must be commensurate with
responsibility." This has been a problem with state government organization
generally.
2. Unity, Plurality, and Accountability
Especially before World War I, the long ballot for state elected officials
rendered it very difficult for governors to coordinate and direct administration. The state government reorganization movement that has been ongoing
for much of the last seventy-five years has called for strengthening the
governor's control over administration by shortening the ballot, including
appointment of the attorney general. 5 The widely accepted principle of administrative organization supporting this prescription is the need for clear
lines of authority and responsibility. 6 "Concentration of authority in the
hands of the governor would enhance accountability because the voters
would know who to blame for administrative failures, as the governor became chief executive in fact and not just name."87
At the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1787, Pennsylvania
delegate James Wilson stressed that a single executive would provide the
"most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. 88 Alexander Hamilton stressed the accountability problem of a plural executive in The Federalist Papers. He contended that
one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive...
is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. .

.

. It

often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine
on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or
series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall.8
In sum,
[T]he plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the
two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of
administrative organization.
Abernathy, supra note 18, at 44-45. Or. more simply, Al Smith asserted: "The attorney general is the
state's lawyer, and the governor should select the lawyer. He is responsible." A.E. BUCK, REORGANIZATION OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 23 (1938) (quoting a speech by Alfred E. Smith).
84. HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER 5 (1970); State Government Reorganization:
The End of the Beginning, PAR ANALYSIS, Oct. 1978, at 7.
85.

PHILLIPS, supra note 18, at 205-11.

86.
87.

Id. at 212-13; Abernathy, supra note 18, at 33-34.
Elling, supra note 76,at 251.

88.

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (emphasis

added).

89.

THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton L. Rossiter ed., 1961).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6

any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which
lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of
the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of
the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office
or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.'
Hamilton argued that the notion that power is safer if dispersed among
several rather than concentrated in one does not rigidly apply to executive
power; that it is safer when there is "a single object for the jealousy and
watchfulness of the people; and, in'a word, that all multiplication of the
Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty."'" Power "lodged in
the hands of one ... will be more narrowly watched and more readily
suspected."92
As Woodrow Wilson, writing as a young political science professor, put
it one hundred years later, "There is no danger in power if only it be not
irresponsible. If it be divided, dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured and
if it be obscured, it is made irresponsible."93 This point later found expression in the "short ballot" principle fostered at the state level, especially in
New York in the early twentieth century, which held that "only those offices
should be elective which are important enough to attract (and deserve) public
examination."'94 Public knowledge of the performance or even the identities
'
of subgubernatorial statewide elected officials is "shockingly low." 95
For
example, when asked in 1990 to identify the Attorney General of Virginia,
who had been in office for almost six years, only thirty-seven percent of
respondents could give the correct answer. By contrast, seventy-six percent
could name the governor."
The indeterminacy created with the multiple executive hampers the
governor's capacity to achieve administrative goals because responsibility is
fragmented and the political costs are high,97 a problem that embraces both

90. Id. at 55.
91. Id. at 57.
92. Id.
93. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 56 POL. SCI, QTRLY. 497-98 (1941) (reprinting
1887 article from volume 2 of same quarterly).
94. RICHARD S. CHILDS, THE SHORT-BALLOT PRINCIPLES vii (1911). Woodrow Wilson headed the
National Short Ballot Association, and New Yorkers who fought for the principle included Charles E.
Hughes, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Alfred E. Smith, Henry L. Stimson, and James Wadsworth. See
Allen T. Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, 38 J.AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 134, 137
(1955).
95. SABATO, supra note 24, at 64.
96. THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS (reporting Virginia
Commonwealth University survey of November 1990, poll information no. VCUI 11990).
97. Thad L. Beyle, Governors, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 191-92 (Virginia Gray et al.
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the issues of accountability and the next topic of government gridlock.
B. Stalemate
A governor's primary role is to establish policy guidance for the various
agencies in the executive branch and to supervise the agencies in the implementation of those policies.98 Many factors affect a governor's ability to
achieve effective policy coordination and control. One of the most critical is
the support and cooperation of competent legal counsel.
When the attorney general has the exclusive constitutional authority to
employ and supervise all lawyers involved in legal matters for executive
agencies of state government, including the lawyers for other elected executive branch officials, the result is to repose in the attorney general sole power
to control the nature and extent of legal services provided to executive
branch agencies and to withhold those legal services as well." Political
pressures and the threat of impeachment would likely prevent wholesale
refusal to provide legal services; but in selected circumstances the problem of
deadlock and frustration of executive branch mission is a real possibility,
especially when a policy disagreement or personality conflict underlies this
impasse."° Partisan differences may cause or exacerbate the problem. Governors confronting such a situation may feel compelled to seek advice of
other counsel in a manner not contemplated under the state constitution.
South Carolina delegate to the Federal Convention Pierce Butler supported a unitary executive because "[d]elays, divisions and dissensions arise from
an executive consisting of many." '' Hamilton recognized this point in
making the case for a single executive in The FederalistPapers. Unity in the
executive produces energy in the executive branch that is "essential to the
steady administration of the laws." '02 Unity contributes to energy by facilitating "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch .... "' 03 Hamilton pointed
to the dissensions of a plural executive in Roman history." He argued that
conflict and rivalry "lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and dis-

eds., 4th ed. 1983).
98. See COLEMAN B. RANSONE, THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR IN THE UNITED STATES 257-59 (1959).
99. But see UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 16: "The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of the State
officers .. " 101 (emphasis added). Even if this language is legally enforceable against withholding of
legal assistance, the practical problems in doing so leave the state agencies at the mercy of the attorney
general. See also McGreevey, supra note 46, at 312-13, 315-16.
100. "[In Michigan,] these officers seldom, if ever, work together harmoniously for the good of the
state. More often, constructive projects become hopelessly deadlocked because of opposition and hostility
between members of the executive branch." Kamberg, supra note 80, at 32; see James N. Miller, Dead
Hand of the Past, 57 NAT'L Civic REV. 183, 186 (1968).
101. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 90 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton L. Rossiter ed., 1961).
103. Id. at 424.
104. Id. at 424-25.
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tract the plans and operation of those whom they divide ....
[and] they
might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government
[and] split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions .. ."o Multiple executive authorities "serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, . . . [and] counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition. . .
As a modern commentator explained,
[S]ome of our state governments' most interesting legal and political infighting has been between the governor as the chief executive officer of the state and the attorney general as the chief legal
officer. It is clear that these two offices do have the potential for
built-in conflict at several levels, from politics to policy to administration ....
And not the least of these is over conflicting
ambitions."°7
As another commentator concluded: "A government of inaction is not a
responsible government. A governor without power is not a responsible governor."'0' The fragmented executive hampers the governor from shaping
and directing executive branch policies. Although the number of statewide
elected officials has diminished slightly during the last thirty years, this area
of governor-attorney general relations is where progress toward effective
gubernatorial leadership has been the slowest." 9
C. Divided Loyalty
The basic attributes of the attorney-client relationship-client employs
the attorney and the attorney serves as representative and agent of the client-are reversed with many elected state attorneys general. The attorney
general in many states assigns a lawyer to a state agency client and can
provide or withhold services. The client agency, unlike other clients, cannot
discharge the attorney without the cooperation and support of the attorney
general or extraordinary relief from the legislature. The traditional rule giving
the client the final decision in all important aspects of representation and

105. Id. at 426.
106. Id. at 427.
107. Beyle. supra note 97, at 192. As one governor told Professor Sabato: "I have had some problems
with my attorney general.... My perception is that the attorney general essentially serves as counsel to
the governor, and his perception is that he is an autonomously elected public official and solely represents
the interests of the public, and the office of governor when he has adequate time and staff." SABATO,
supra note 24, at 64-65.
108. RANSONE, supra note 98, at 402.
109. SABATO, supra note 24, at 63.
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litigation is compromised. Perhaps the biggest problem is the need for the
client to have total confidence in counsel. A governor cannot have that confidence in a person she did not select and who not only is a political rival of
the governor but may even have designs on her job.
A divided loyalty problem permeates the representation of state agencies,
especially when the attorney general is independently elected. If a deputy or
assistant attorney general is assigned to provide legal counsel to a state agency, that attorney's duty of loyalty should be exclusively to that agency. However, if the attorney general disagrees with the policies of the agency, the
subordinate attorney faces the dilemma of adhering to the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to a client versus furthering the policy preferences of his employer,
the attorney general. The tension between legal policy and program policy is
not easily resolved with appeals for cooperation and, where applicable, bipartisan support to make the system work or through reliance on the governor to
calm executive branch disputes."0 On the other hand, it has been suggested
that an independent attorney general may provide more objective advice."'
One outgrowth of the divided loyalty problem is the temptation of state
agencies to hire law-trained people who are accountable to the agency
head."' This practice is prevalent in governors' offices, where in-house
counsel commonly are employed."' Whether these law-trained individuals
are hired as lawyers or not, agency staff may rely on and have more confidence in them than in attorneys assigned by the elected attorney general." 4
The in-house attorneys may have both centralizing and decentralizing
tendencies on the legal policy of the state. On the one hand, the agency-hired
lawyers are accountable to the agency head and ultimately to the governor,
largely eliminating the potential conflict between policy implementation and
legal counseling functions. On the other hand, the "closet attorney" phenomenon exacerbates the potential for conflicting legal advice and undermining

110. See Dave Frohnmayer, Representing the State: Public Interest Comes First, 61 J. ST. GOV'T 91,
93 (1988).
111. See N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 96.
112. In North Carolina, for example,
[t]he practice of having a legal advisor or in-house legal counsel within the agency-client
represented by the Attorney General has become widespread. This fact has complicated the
role of the Attorney General as much as, or more so, than any other one factor during the
evolutionary process of this office over the past twenty years.
Thomburg, supra note 2, at 358 (footnote omitted).
113. NAAG, supra note 2, at 44; RANSONE. supra note 98, at 332-33; N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note i, at 96.
114. A survey of public institutions of higher education regarding delivery of legal services revealed
some interesting responses in this regard. Of the 18 major research universities responding to the survey,
six relied upon "quasi-representation," defined as "legal advice given by an employee who is an attorney
but who is not in a legal position." It is "unavoidable" not to receive such advice, according to one respondent. UTAH SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION, STATE BOARD OF REGENTS, RESPONSE TO LEGAL SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE, Aug. 30, 1990, at I (on file with author).
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the relationship between the agency and the attorney general.
The national trend has been toward a consolidated system in which legal
services are provided to the various state agencies through the attorney
general's office, especially in the area of litigation.' This structure is said
"to maintain consistent policy on state legal issues and efficient use of state
resources." 116 The case for centralized legal services is strongest for litigation so that government agencies do not take inconsistent positions in court
and to facilitate the resolution of inter-agency disputes within state government."'
One attorney general argues that in states not following a consolidated
legal services system, the attorney general is made accountable for the rendering of legal services, including bad performance, despite lack of control
over house counsel." 8 It is ironic that those who argue forcefully for centralized legal services based on accountability also argue strenuously against
an appointed attorney general, even though the latter approach is also based
on the same principle of centralized accountable administration. Nonetheless,
unlike the appointed federal attorney general, whose jurisdiction over government lawyers is not complete because other agencies employ their own attorneys, many state attorneys general are responsible for all of their states' legal
work. 9
The problem becomes intolerable in the situation where non-lawyers in
the agencies attempt to give legal advice, perhaps due in part to a scarcity of
legal resources in state government. A partial solution to this problem is to
make clear that the attorney general is the chief legal advisor and has the
power and the responsibility to formulate consistent legal policy. The other is
to eliminate the agency attorneys altogether and consolidate all representation
in the attorney general's office, but then the divided loyalty problem emerges.
Indeed, these issues of constitutional structure and role can lead to a
variety of hybrid arrangements. The range includes: the attorney general
assigning deputies to work with the agencies, staff lawyers hired by the
agencies with the consent of the attorney general, the attorney general employing private law firms, independent agencies hiring their own counsel, and
the closet attorneys and non-lawyers providing legal services within the exec-

115. The attorneys general agree that the consolidated services arrangement is optimal, as reflected in
resolutions adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General in 1971. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATION OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 161,
170-71 (1977). Central litigating authority for the federal government rests with the Attorney General by
statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 515-519, 547 (Attorney General has power to appear in court on all cases in
which the United States has an interest).
116. NAAG, supra note 2, at 51.
117. Babcock, supra note 58, at 188-89.
118. Frohnmayer, supra note 110, at 92; see NAAG, supra note 2, at 12.
119. NAAG, supra note 2, at 1I.
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utive branch without the support and often the knowledge of the attorney
general.
D. Politicization
Whether appointed or elected, the attorney general serves in a political
office. However, if elected, the attorney general is subject to interest group
electoral politics and all the potentially compromising influences that entails,
including reliance on financial support to be elected and re-elected to office.
The reasons for giving judges some independence from elective politics
apply to this position As well. On the other hand, an appointed attorney general could be the product of political cronyism and therefore be subject to
undue political pressures and interference from the governor and her supporters. In a survey of attorneys general reported some time ago, both those
favoring election and those preferring appointment gave the same reason for
their choice: the advantage of political independence in rendering legal services and law enforcement. 20 However, the politicization problem cuts in
favor of the appointive model.
The appointed attorney general is at least one step removed from interest
group politics. The risk that an attorney general will compromise professionalism and bend to political pressure in rendering opinions and carrying out
law enforcement responsibilities is greater with a popularly elected and politically ambitious attorney general who has gubernatorial aspirations. History
teaches that many of them do.' Elective attorneys general are more likely
to regard the office as a political stepping stone.'22 One study of state attorneys general found that appointees had a slightly stronger educational record,
more experience in law practice and the legal work of state governments, and
a slightly higher standing in their profession.'23 "The data certainly confirm
the assumption that elective status increases the political nature of the of12 4
fice."'
At the very least, popular election seems to offer little benefit over appointment as a means to insulate the work of the office from inappropriate
political influence.' 5 A major exception may be the attorney general's role
as chief criminal law enforcer. When the political relationship between the
governor and attorney general is too close, misplaced loyalty and trust can
result in misuse of power. The Watergate experience is frequently offered as

120.
121.
1990).
122.
123.
124.
125.

Abernathy, supra note 18, at 36.
Thad L. Beyle, Governor, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 208 (Virginia Gray et al. eds.,
Thompson, supra note 18, at 29-31.
Id. at 24-41.
Id at 28.
Abernathy, supra note 18, at 47.
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E. Counseling versus Prosecution
Perhaps the problems discussed in this section are the price states are
willing to pay for the benefits of an independently elected attorney general
serving a check and balance watchdog role in the executive branch. However, there is another aspect to the tension between structure and role that cannot be balanced in this way. Although the duty is shared in a variety of ways
with local government prosecutors, most state attorneys general have as one
of their responsibilities the investigation and prosecution of state criminal
offenses. 27 The conflict arises when the attorney general can both counsel
state agencies and prosecute them for criminal wrongdoing. The attorneyclient relationship is built on trust, loyalty, and confidentiality. That foundation is precarious if not impossible when the attorney general is both advocate and potential adversary.
This role conflict creates both the risk of ineffective legal counseling for
the agency due to agency caution or distrust and ineffective investigation and
prosecution due to attorney loyalty to the agency. For some, the answer may
be that agency wrongdoing should be handled by an independent prosecution
team separated by "walls" within the attorney general's office or referred to
an outside local or federal prosecutor. In many states, the majority of criminal investigation and prosecution through trial is carried out at the local
government level with the state attorney general's office handling most of the
criminal appeals. At the federal level, Congress created the office of independent counsel because it was concerned about conflicts that could develop
when the executive branch is called to investigate its high-ranking offi12 8
cers.
F. Rogue Agency
An attorney general should not interfere with an agency's policy choice
as long as the policy is legal. 29 However, whether a policy decision is legal
is not always clear. When it is unclear, an independently elected attorney
general could unnecessarily frustrate public policy. When it is clear, howev126. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 7. at 171-74 (describing how Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
could have effectively investigated and prosecuted the Watergate burglary but for his personal loyalty to
and trust in President Nixon and former Attorney General John Mitchell).
127. The attorney general "is the most visible and influential state official in the fight against crime."
Thornburg, supra note 2, at 378.
128. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (upholding independent counsel provisions in
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1,
6-11 (1990).
129. See Frohnmayer, supra note 110, at 92.
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er, and the agency is intent on acting illegally, the attorney general, elected
or appointed, faces a practical challenge.
Two commentators who have confronted this problem advise that "the
attorney general can use persuasion, seek support through the media, apply
political pressure, and, as a last resort, litigate."'" It would not be uncommon in such a conflict situation for the attorney general to withdraw as counsel for the state agency client and authorize employment of special counsel.' The problem with the attorney general suing the agency is that the
agency official will protest that a suit for failure to follow the attorney
general's advice is a betrayal because the attorney general is the agency's
lawyer.' Indeed, the California Supreme Court held that the state attorney
general could not withdraw from representation of state officers and agencies
and then take a position opposed to those same clients.'33 Cases in other
jurisdictions allow their attorneys general to sue state officers or agencies." Nonetheless, the problem of the rogue agency is a pronounced example of the conflict of loyalty and counseling versus prosecution issues
discussed previously.
G. Resources and Management
One of the problems in assessing these issues is the difficulty of separating constitutional structure and role from management efficiency and availability of resources. In other words, if there are deficiencies in legal representation of the executive branch generally or certain agencies particularly,
they may stem from lack of sufficient lawyer personnel in the attorney
general's office or failure of that office and the state agencies to manage
available attorneys as productively as possible. Indeed, although not unrelated, resource and management issues may be as critical to the quality of executive branch legal representation as questions involving constitutional
structure and role. Fulfilling the promise of the desired constitutional structure and role requires adequate resources and organization to facilitate the attorney general's responsibilities.

130. Charles M. Oberly III & Fred S. Silverman, When Worlds Collide: Avoiding Public Showdowns,
61 J. ST. GOV'T 94, 95 (1988).
131. See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Cal. 1981).
132. Oberly & Silverman, supra note 130, at 95.
133. See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206. 1209 (Cal. 1981).
134. See, e.g., Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 387
A.2d 533 (Conn. 1978); Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977); E.P.A. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50 (11. 1977). In Superintendent of Ins. v. Attorney General, 558 A.2d 1197
(Me. 1989), the court held that the Maine Attorney General who disagrees with a state agency is not disqualified from participation in litigation "affecting the public interest merely because members of his staff
had previously provided representation to the agency at the administrative stage of the proceeding." Id. at
1204.
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III. ALTERNATIVE MODELS
The foregoing discussion points to two basic issues: organization and
selection.' 35 The organizational question is whether the legal work for a
state should be provided by agency counsel employed by and accountable to
the client agencies or by counsel employed and supplied to the client agencies by a centralized legal office. Resolution of this question can include a
variety of hybrid arrangements and exceptions involving agency counsel and
central legal staff. The selection question is whether the attorney general
should be elected or appointed. Depending on the way responsibilities for
legal representation are allocated, the organization and selection issues can
overlap.
A. Agency Counsel or Consolidated Legal Services
It is useful to distinguish between litigation and agency counseling in
addressing the organization question. The case for centralized litigation staffing is strong. There may be exceptions based on special need that could be
handled by the attorney general hiring outside counsel or by authorizing
agency litigation counsel under state law or through agreement with the
attorney general's office. The special need may be based on area of expertise
or the exigencies of a particular case.
The case for consolidated legal staffing of advice and counsel to state
agencies is based on the the goals of achieving efficient and consistent legal
policy for the state. A related argument is to guard against the unnecessary
proliferation of lawyers throughout state government, although this danger
could be alleviated with effective executive management and legislative
budget oversight. The consistency and efficiency arguments, however, favor
the consolidated model as a general rule. However, there may be cause for
more exceptions to this approach than in the litigation context.
A given agency may have special need for agency counsel to assist in
policy implementation. In a state where the attorney general is elected, a
given agency may be so central to the governor's policy agenda that accountability and loyalty considerations may point to agency counsel. This has been
recognized especially for the governor's office itself. Moreover, the practical
needs of agency representation, including the specialization and expertise
required, may point more strongly in some instances to an on-site, in-house
counsel working closely with agency staff.
Entities in state government such as independent agencies and institutions

135. Another issue is tenure, which includes the length of term and any restrictions on re-election or reappointment. Greater tenure offers more time to achieve proficiency and to exert more influence over state
government issues and therefore generally enlarges the attorney general's power. See Winder, supra note
4, at 74-75.
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of higher education that are largely outside the governor's management span
of control may merit employment of in-house counsel, particularly when
accountability should be and often is focused upon the head of that agency or
institution. 36 Given a general preference for consolidated legal services, the
burden to justify in-house counsel should be on those state entities seeking
that arrangement; and a process to meet that burden, such as legislative approval, should be followed. Even under those circumstances, ultimate responsibility for establishing the state's legal policy should be lodged with the
attorney general, whether that official is elected or appointed.
B. Appointed Attorney General
Five states and the federal government appoint the attorney general.
Under this system, the governor or agency heads are more likely than in the
elective model to select their own lawyers within budget and policy constraints set by the legislature. The attorney general reports to the governor,
making the legal representation for the executive branch accountable to the
governor.
Public administration experts recognize the attorney general as one of the
most important administrative officials and generally recommend gubernatorial appointment of the attorney general.'" Leading scholars on the American
governorship have advocated centralization of state government management
and planning 3 ' and gubernatorial appointment of top executive branch officials as opposed to statewide elections.'39 The National Municipal League's
"Model State Constitution" calls for the governor to be the only statewide
elected official, declaring that the attorney general "must be part of the chief
executive's administrative team. ''"" ° The state government reorganization
movement during the twentieth century has stressed the values of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy, which are public administration goals traceable to the works of Woodrow Wilson and the President's Committee on
Administrative Management (the Brownlow Committee). 4 ' The main objective of reform has been to achieve unity of command in the governor,
including reduction of constraints on gubernatorial appointment power. 42
136. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the state university "is not an executive department
agency" and accordingly its "functions may require special legal counsel." Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1336, 1340 (Utah 1982).
137. PHILtPS, supra note 18, at 208.
138. William H. Young, The Development of the Governorship, 31 ST. GOV'T 181 (1958).
139. Bennett Mitlow Rich, STATE CONSTrUONS: THE GOVERNOR, STATE CONSTInmONAL STUDIES
PROJECT, Series 11, No. 3, at 30-33 (1960).
140. COMMrI-FEE ON STATE GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTUTION
WITH EXPLANATORY ARTICLES (1948).
141. James K. Conant, In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow: Executive Branch Reorganization in
the States, 1965 to 1987, PUBLIc ADM. REv. 892 (Sept./Oct. 1988).
142. Id. at 893.
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Between 1965 and 1987, the "golden era of state reorganization," gubernatorial appointment power was expanded 143in each of the twenty-two states where
the executive branch was overhauled.
This arrangement would diminish the problems of constitutional stalemate, accountability, and divided loyalty. However, it would not eliminate
and may aggravate the counseling versus prosecution problem because the
attorney general would be beholden to the governor and perhaps less likely
to take seriously the investigation and prosecution of state agencies or officials for criminal violations. This problem at the federal level has led to the
appointment of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute alleged
wrongdoing on the part of high level executive branch officials. It has further
led to the development of offices of Inspector General, situated throughout
the federal government, to audit and investigate their respective agencies."
A strong barrier to reform in this direction is the historical experience
and popular expectation of electing state attorneys general.'45 Opposition
comes from elected attorneys general, legislators who do not wish to
strengthen the governor's hand over state agencies, agency heads who see a
threat to established legislative and client group relationships, and interest
groups with a stake in the status quo.'46 Most proposals to shorten the statewide elected official ballot meet with public resistance.' 47 No state has
changed from election to executive appointment of the attorney general. 4
It appears unlikely that, apart from the experts on state executive branch reform, any movement will develop in this direction.

143. Id. at 894-95.
144. See PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT, INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY (1993).
145. A West Virginia poll resulted in 24% in favor and 63% opposed to abolishing the state elected
office of attorney general. THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS
(reporting the West Virginia Poll of March 1989, poll information no. WVA31989). See generally JAMES
L. GARNETT, REORGANIZING STATE GOVERNMENT: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 51 (1980).

146. Elling, supra note 76, at 252-53. Some fear giving the governor too much power. See Emmanuel
B. Reese, Should the Governor Appoint the Secretary of State and Attorney General? No!, 27 MICH. ST.
B.J. 33 (1948).
147. Voters resist appointment because they think direct election is more democratic. CHARLES R.
ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 262 (1976); SABATO, supra note 24, at 66.
148. Id. at 66; Thompson, supra note 18, at 18. Since New York changed from an appointed to an
elected attorney general in 1846, numerous attempts have been made to go back to an appointed attorney
general, but none has succeeded. See N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note i, at 195-96. Several factors have been identified that impede administrative reorganization, including opposition of vested
interests within the organization, special interest groups supportive of the status quo, the difficulty of
effectuating constitutional change, the persistence of Jacksonian theories of popular democracy, and the
need for compromise. Phillips, supra note 18, at 219. Indiana in the early 1940s and Pennsylvania in 1980
changed from executive appointment to popular election. NAAG, supra note 2, at 20.
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C. Elected Prosecutor/PublicAdvocate Attorney General
The public, whether accurately or not, generally considers the attorney
general to be primarily the prosecutor for the state.'49 If the elected attorney
general were limited in authority to criminal investigation and prosecution in
certain specified areas, some of the problems with structure and role would
be alleviated. 5 ' This would continue to be the case if the role were defined
broadly as one of law enforcement. In addition to criminal law enforcement,
the elected attorney general's authority could also embrace, for example, civil
enforcement of antitrust, civil rights, consumer, and environmental laws. The
governor would appoint a separate counsel for the state who would be responsible for providing legal services to state agencies, or the state agencies
themselves would employ attorneys on their staffs.
Under this system, the attorney general/prosecutor-public advocate, as an
independently elected official, would have some insulation from gubernatorial overreaching. Moreover, the checking or watchdog function of the attorney
general would be preserved with respect to criminal wrongdoing in the executive branch. The power to investigate may concentrate on "government
misconduct, malfeasance, or individual criminal activity.''. Indeed, the
watchdog role may be enhanced because the conflict between the advising
and prosecuting functions carried out by the same office would be substantially eliminated.
With a gubernatorially-appointed counsel for state agencies, the accountability of executive branch agencies would not be confused with the quality
of performance of attorneys loyal to an independently elected employer.
Moreover, the lawyers themselves would not face the tension between agency
direction and attorney general policy agendas, thereby alleviating the stalemate and divided loyalty problems discussed earlier. The governor or agency
head would have the authority to act as legal employer in this context and
would not be constrained to rely on the independently elected attorney general to do so. Although potential remains for conflict in policy objectives insofar as law enforcement decisions carry policy implications, the risk of gridlock would be lessened.
This approach receives support by analogy from the view among public
administration experts that the state auditor responsible for post audits and

149. NAAG, supra note 2,at 13.
150. A recent article on the federal Attorney General argues that "The Attorney General's role as the
nation's chief law enforcement officer has the potential for clashing with the Attorney General's White
House role as the President's legal adviser." Mitchell Rogovin & Wendy M. Rogovin, The Office of Attorney General: Not Properly Political, 9 J.L. & PoL. 317, 318 (1993). The Rogovins conclude that "a President must select two people to fulfill these positions." Id. at 321; see also Whitney N. Seymour, Jr., United States Attorney: An Inside View of "Justice," in AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 229-32
(1975) (proposing to divide functions between a presidential advisor and a chief prosecutor).
151. NAAG, supra note 2, at 14.
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review of fiscal records of state agency spending is not an administrative
officer and should not be appointed by the governor but should be independently elected, either by the public or the legislature.'52 Like the auditor's
function, the watchdog role of the attorney general would be recognized and
focused.
Finally, a state wishing to address the constitutional structure and role
problems of the status quo attorney general arrangement may find less political resistance and historical inertia (though much would still remain) with a
model that preserves popular election with more focused and better-defined
responsibilities.'5 3
D. Elected Attorney General with Separate Legal Functions
There are many variations on the standard elected attorney general model. One variation is to elect the attorney general, allow the governor and
executive branch agencies in some instances to hire their own counsel, and
determine where to draw the line between legal work in the executive branch
agencies and the legal work remaining with the attorney general's office. A
way to draw the line would be to assign the advisory function to the agency
lawyers and the litigation function to the attorney general. In the federal
system, client agencies do not generally have litigating authority but do have
in-house counsel. Each agency contains a general counsel's office that operates between its policy administration and the Department of Justice." It
would be possible to limit the litigation in the elective attorney general's office by defining the nature of the litigation to those matters that involve a
substantial public interest component or a public policy question within the
attorney general's watchdog role. The attorney general could also be assigned
to resolve interagency disputes (akin to the Office of Legal Counsel in the
federal Department of Justice).
CONCLUSION

The goal of the foregoing is to channel discussion about the constitutional status and role of the state attorney general, not to prescribe specific struc-

152. See PHILLIPS, supra note 18, at 209-10, 218. "An auditor should be outside gubernatorial control,
as he audits how state funds were spent to see if legislative intent was indeed carried out. The governor is
generally in charge of carrying out this intent, so it would do the legislature or the taxpayer little good to
have him also select the audiior." Beyle, supra note 97, at 191.
153. Pennsylvania is an example of a variation on this model. The "Commonwealth Attorneys Act" of
1980 divided legal responsibilities between an elected attorney general and a general counsel appointed by
the governor. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 732-101 to -506 (1990); George Jugovic, Jr., Legislating in
the Public Interest: Strict Liability for Criminal Activity under the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management
Act, 22 ENVTL. L. 1375, 1380-82 (Portland) (discussing how Commonwealth Attorneys Act changed the
balance of power in state law enforcement).
154. Babcock, supra note 58, at 186.
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tures and duties for a particular state. Every state is unique, and no state can
write on a clean slate on this issue. Nonetheless, the dearth of theoretical and
empirical work on this subject suggests the need to assess critically the assumptions and historical antecedents of the state attorney general's office.
For example, the position was constituted in almost all states before the
twentieth century growth of state bureaucracies, which rely upon legal counsel for advice and representation.
It is a complex office with a broad range of responsibilities, including
quasi-legislative and judicial functions. How best to carry out those duties in
an efficient and accountable manner points in certain directions. For executive branch legal representation, gubernatorial appointment of counsel would
offer greater political accountability, a lower risk of policy gridlock, and
diminished conflict of loyalty, but perhaps cause some sacrifice of a checking function within the executive branch.
For public law enforcement, civil and criminal, the independent election
of the attorney general would insulate legal decisionmaking from political
pressures of the governor and the governor's appointees, but would also in
some areas pose the dangers of accountability confusion, policy impasse, and
politicizing an office with quasi-judicial responsibilities. Even so, at least for
criminal investigation and prosecution, the advantages of political independence may outweigh the disadvantages.
Provision of legal services to state government increasingly occurs
through a centralized attorney staff. As a general rule, this approach makes
sense from an efficiency and consistency perspective. However, there may be
circumstances in which agency appointment of in-house counsel would be
appropriate, especially when the agency head is regarded as having accountability for agency performance independent of the governor. Independent
agencies and state colleges and universities are the prime examples.
Trying to sort this out in the turf-hungry battlefield of state politics may
require heroic measures of statecraft and short-term political sacrifice. That
may be too much to expect, especially when the terms of the dialogue are
cast initially, as reflected here, at such a general level. The dialogue should
move forward with more focused attention on the office and its place in state
government. Then perhaps expectations for meaningful reform will improve
with time.

